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And therefore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the
parties must by their own accord, set up for right Reason, the Rea-
son of some Arbitrator... to whose sentence they will both stand,
or their controversy must either come to blowes, or be undecided,
for want of a right Reason constituted by Nature; so is it also in all
debates of what kind soever.1
Introduction
Commercial arbitration as a method of alternative dispute resolu-
tion boasts the advantages of flexibility, efficiency, and finality. Par-
ties ostensibly bargain for these advantages when fashioning
arbitration agreements. With the enactment of arbitration statutes,
legislatures endorse arbitral finality by providing limited grounds for
judicial review of awards. Because these statutory grounds for review
are silent regarding substantive review of the arbitral award, the
courts have settled in relative repose about the finality and un-
reviewability of the arbitrator's determination of the merits of a dis-
pute. However, arbitral choice of remedy has proven to be fertile
ground for attempted judicial activism. A recent example is the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal's decision in Advanced Micro Devices [AMD]
v. Intel Corp.,2 which was subsequently reversed by the California
Supreme Court.
This Note explores the question of when commercial arbitrators
"exceed their powers" in fashioning relief. The inquiry begins with
* J.D., 1995; M.Ed. 1991, B.A. 1990 University of California at Los Angeles. I
thank all of those who have extended constant love and support, including my parents
(Richard and May), Lucas, Kelly, my grandparents (Mel and Mary Jane), Alex and Louie.
1. THOMAS HOBBFS, LEViATHAN 33 (Oxford ed. 1909) (1651).
2. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73 (Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 885 P.2d 994 (Cal. 1994).
[1907]
the basic parameters of the statutory "excess of powers" provision,
and the courts' role regarding this ground of review. The next inquiry
in identifying when a commercial arbitrator has exceeded remedial
authority draws upon concepts from the law of remedies and guidance
from labor arbitration cases. Crucial to the arbitral remedial issue is
identification of the sources both granting and limiting arbitral powers
and the courts' level of deference when considering the scope of arbi-
tral authority.
Analysis of judicial decisions regarding how and to what extent
arbitrators may fashion relief reveals imprecise standards that allow
unprincipled interference in arbitral awards. The most popular of
these formulae is the so-called "essence" test of United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.3 The use of such standards has proven
contradictory and unworkable.
This Note advocates a generous view of arbitral remedial power
for several reasons. First, as a creature of contract hired to determine
rights under a specific agreement, the arbitrator is the parties' official
"contract reader" and should enjoy flexibility in both interpreting the
contract and fashioning corresponding relief. Second, the gradual ac-
ceptance of arbitral awards of punitive damages gives historical sup-
port for entrusting flexible remedial authority with the arbitrator. Not
only should arbitrators have the power to award as a court would (as
with punitive damages), but this remedial power should not be limited
to that of a court.
This Note calls upon legislators to clarify the "excess of powers"
provision for judicial review, keeping in mind: (1) the necessity of
arbitral flexibility, (2) the fundamental purposes of contract remedies,
and (3) the need for some judicial oversight of arbitrally fashioned
remedies. This Note also advocates the statutory requirement of writ-
ten, reasoned arbitral findings. However, until the Legislature takes
such action, and following the California Supreme Court's decision in
AMD, practitioners who wish to limit an arbitrator's remedial powers
are wise to expressly set forth clear guidelines and limitations in the
arbitration agreement.
Part I of this Note reviews the propounded advantages of the ar-
bitral process, and discusses the most common illustrations of discon-
tent prompting quests for judicial intervention. Part II outlines the
statutory grounds for judicial review of arbitral awards, with particular
attention to the "excess of powers" provision. Part III analyzes the
scope of arbitral remedial powers as understood by the courts, and
reveals the inadequacies of articulated standards. Part IV offers sup-
port for affording arbitrators remedial flexibility, and suggests guide-
3. 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960) (holding that an arbitrator's award is valid if it draws its
essence from the agreement).
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lines for legislators who desire to amend the "excess of powers"
provision for review, and/or require written arbitral findings. Finally,
this Note includes some suggestions for practitioners who desire to
use the arbitration process but wish to limit arbitral remedial
authority.
L Propounded Arbitration Advantages and Corresponding
Discontent
Arbitration may be simply defined as "the resolution of disputes
during the contract period by an impartial person designated by the
parties for just that purpose."' 4 Courts and members of the judiciary
have encouraged arbitration as a binding method of alternative dis-
pute resolution, partly because of the "mushrooming case loads of the
courts." 5 The arbitration alternative to litigation for binding dispute
resolution has proven to be a viable and popular method between
commercial parties.6
The propounded advantages of arbitration stem from its depar-
ture from courtroom processes. Parties in arbitration are relatively
"free from the requirements and expectations familiar to judicial pro-
ceedings with respect both to the formulation of pleadings and causes
of action and to historical and current legal theories as to the availa-
bility of remedies." 7 Arbitration is frequently touted as "'a speedy
and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution." ' s Parties in
arbitration expect to have their case heard and decided in a reason-
able amount of time with a minimum of fees for attorneys and arbitra-
4. Lewis B. Kaden, Judges and Arbitrators: Observations on the Scope of Judicial
Review, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 275 (1980).
5. State of the Judiciary Address by Chief Justice Burger, reprinted in 109 N.J. L.J.,
Feb. 4, 1982, at 1. Former Chief Justice Burger said:
We must now use the inventiveness, the ingenuity and the resourcefulness that
have long characterized the American business and legal community, to shape
new tools.... Against this background I focus today on arbitration, not as the
answer or cure-all for the mushrooming case loads of the courts, but as one exam-
ple of "a better way to do it."
6. See Matthew David Disco, Note, The Impression of Possible Bias: What a Neutral
Arbitrator Must Disclose in California, 45 HASTrNGs L.J. 113, 113 n.2 (1993) (collecting
data on the use of arbitration).
This Note assumes arm's-length bargaining between parties for arbitration benefits,
although the contrary may actually be the case. See e.g., Michael Z. Green, Preempting
Justice Through Binding Arbitration of Future Disputes: Mere Adhesion Contracts or a Trap
for the Unwary Consumer?, 5 Loy. CONSUMER L. REP. 112 (1993).
7. SCM Corp. v. Fisher Park Lane Co., 358 N.E.2d 1024, 1028 (N.Y. 1976).
8. Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 901 (Cal. 1992) (quoting Ericksen,
Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street, 673 P.2d 251, 257 (Cal.
1983)); see e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. USX Corp., 966 F.2d 1394, 1404 (11th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1386 (1993).
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tion personnel. Furthermore, unlike judges, arbitrators may be
chosen for their expertise and familiarity in a particular industry.9
This chosen expert engenders confidence that the award is a product
of familiarity with the trade, and not of "strict[ ] legal analysis or emo-
tion."'1 Lastly, and what has proven most troublesome, the arbitral
award is "final and binding." Parties in arbitration expect that the
award "'shall put the dispute to rest""' and resolve it "'without neces-
sity for any contact with the court.""12
These advantages of arbitration 3 are the primary benefits the
parties seek in an agreement to arbitrate. When a party, discontent
with the award, seeks to have it reviewed in the courts, the courts
generally attempt to give effect to the original bargain of arbitral final-
ity.14 Courts "long ago recognized that [their] limited role in review-
ing arbitration awards is necessary to preserve the bargained-for
purpose of arbitration, which is the avoidance of litigation and its con-
comitant costs and delays."'15 Indeed, if courts were permitted "ex-
9. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Garrity v. Lyle Stuart,
Inc. Reconsidered, 66 B.U. L. REV. 953, 970-71 (1986). It has been observed, however, that
labor arbitrators may be more likely an expert in the field than commercial arbitrators.
Stuart R. Mandel, Case Note, Arbitration: Grounds for Vacating Award: Specific Perform-
ance of Personal Services Contract, 7 UCLA L. REv. 507,510 n.23 (1960). Since the parties
negotiate in choosing arbitrators, they enjoy some flexibility in determining their expertise.
10. Stipanowich, supra note 9, at 1002 (footnote omitted). Thus, some parties actually
invite a departure from judicial remedies.
11. Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 902 (quoting Yarowsky, Comment, Judicial Deference to
Arbitral Determinations: Continuing Problems of Power and Finality, 23 UCLA L. REV.
936, 948-49 (1976)).
12. Id. at 902 (quoting Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 696 P.2d 645, 648 n.5 (Cal. 1985)).
Another advantage to arbitration is that it "is conducted in a private and informal
setting, protective of trade secrets and familiar to businessmen." Margaret Pedrick Sulli-
van, The Scope of Modern Arbitral Awards, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1988).
13. See generally Sullivan, supra note 12, at 1114.
14. Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 902 ("Ensuring arbitral finality thus requires that judicial
intervention in the arbitration process be minimized") (citing City of Oakland v. United
Public Employees, 224 Cal. Rptr. 523 (Ct. App. 1986)).
15. Local 771, I.A.T.S.E. v. RKO Gen., Inc., 546 F.2d 1107, 1113 (2d Cir. 1977).
When the losing party in arbitration asks a court not to give effect to an award, it
is asking that the conclusiveness which is at the heart of the process be with-
held .... [T]he parties have contracted for a final and binding award; the party
who resists adherence to it is therefore seeking to be relieved of his bargain. ...
[W]hether judicial intercession results in enforcement or vacation of the award,
expediency in the resolution of the dispute is lost.
Yarowsky, supra note 11, at 949. As one court noted:
The Defendant... sought to avoid judicial resolution [by resorting to arbitration]
of any disputes with its customer, the Plaintiff. It now should be held to its bar-
gain which is to accept the limited scope of the review by this Court .... To
permit a full scale trial de novo by this Court would only frustrate the process and
provide an additional remedy not covered by the contract between the parties.
The Defendant is not entitled to a second bite out of the dispute resolution apple.
1910 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
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pansive judicial oversight," such interference with the arbitral system
would jeopardize its workability.16 As Judge Learned Hand
admonished:
Arbitration may or may not be a desirable substitute for trials in
courts; as to that the parties must decide in each instance. But when
they have adopted it, they must be content with its informalities;
they may not hedge it about with those procedural limitations which
it is precisely its purpose to avoid. They must content themselves
with looser approximations to the enforcement of their rights than
those that the law accords them, when they resort to its
machinery.17
However, the popularity and widespread use of arbitration has
lead to much discontent and litigation. A losing party, shocked by a
seemingly unfair process, an allegedly outrageous arbitral finding of
law or fact, or an unforeseeable award, will often seek a sympathetic
ear in the judiciary. Some courts have listened:
the initial attractiveness of dispute resolution by arbitration has
waned with the experience of now finding that arbitration often
does not provide simple, inexpensive, and expeditious dispute reso-
lution but rather "is complex, expensive and time consuming," the
"results" of which, "by private and untrained 'judges,"' are distantly
remote from the fair process procedurally followed and application
of principled law found in the judicial process.' 8
The discontent with arbitral remedies is illustrated in the case of
Advanced Micro Devices [AMD] v. Intel Corp.'9 AMD and Intel en-
tered into a 10-year contract for the exchange of earned information.
Basically, the contract was to ensure alternate sourcing of each com-
pany's products.20 Five years into the contract, AMD compelled arbi-
tration seeking rights to the Intel 80386 microprocessor.2 ' After 355
days of hearings spanning four and one-half years, the arbitrator
found that AMD did not earn rights to the Intel 80386. However, he
concluded that Intel had violated the contract by "breach[ing] the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as well as 'its implied
covenant to negotiate reasonably to further the goals of the relation-
ship between the parties." '22
Ehrich v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 559, 562 (W.D.S.D. 1987) (emphasis
added).
16. Yarowsky, supra note 11, at 962.
17. American Almond Prods. Co. v. Consol. Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448, 451 (2d
Cir. 1944).
18. Ehrich, 675 F. Supp. at 562 (quoting Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc.,
783 F.2d 743, 751 n.12 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986)).
19. 885 P.2d 994 (Cal. 1994).
20. Id. at 996-97.
21. Id. at 997.
22. Id. at 997-98.
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The parties in AMD had granted the arbitrator broad powers to
fashion a remedy with a typical clause: "The Arbitrator may grant
any remedy or relief which the Arbitrator deems just and equitable
and within the scope of the agreement of the parties, including, but
not limited to, specific performance of a contract. ' 23 The arbitrator
found that, as a result of Intel's breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, AMD suffered loss of profits and good will.24 The
arbitrator further concluded that "'actual damages are immeasurable;
and nominal damages only are inequitable.' ' 25 Accordingly, the arbi-
trator determined that the appropriate remedy was to effectively un-
dermine Intel's collateral legal challenges to AMD's allegedly
infringing use of its reverse-engineered version of the Intel 80386, the
Am386.26 Thus, the arbitrator awarded AMD, inter alia, "a perma-
nent, nonexclusive and royalty-free license to any Intel intellectual
property embodied in the Am386." 27 Moreover, the arbitrator ex-
tended for two years all patent and copyright licensing agreements
that pertained to the Am386. 8
Upon AMD's petition, the California Superior Court confirmed
the award and denied Intel's petition for correction or vacatur.29 The
court of appeal reversed, rejecting AMD's argument that the arbitra-
tor may determine his own scope of remedial power, free from judicial
interference.30 Borrowing the familiar "essence" test from labor arbi-
tration cases,31 the court of appeal found that the arbitration award
did not have the requisite "rational nexus" to the underlying agree-
ment. The court found that AMD should not have rights pertaining to
an unearned product, nor should the contract be extended another
two years through arbitration "which the parties could not have done
23. Id. at 997. Significantly, this grant of remedial power was worded identically to
American Arbitration Association's Commercial Arbitration Rule 43 ("Rule 43"). See
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, Rule 43, at
17 (Mar. 1, 1992), reprinted in BETTE J. ROTH ET AL., THE ALTERNATIVE DIsPTrrE RESO-
LUTION PRACTICE GUIDE pt. II, app. 3, at 9 (1993).
Of dubious significance was a further "order of reference" limiting remedies to what
the arbitrator "in his discretion determine[d] to be fair and reasonable but not in excess of
his jurisdiction." AMD, 885 P.2d at 1007. This order of reference was probably not signifi-
cant because it was redundant with Rule 43, and like Rule 43, it spoke only to the parties
and the arbitrator, and did not purport to bind a reviewing court.
24. AMD, 885 P.2d at 998.
25. Id. at 998 (quoting the arbitrator).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 998-99.
28. Id. at 999.
29. Id.
30. AMD, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73, 77 (Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 885 P.2d 994 (Cal. 1994).
31. Id. at 77-78 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 597 (1960)).
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under the contract." 32 Hence, the appellate court reasoned that the
arbitrator's "rewriting" of the agreement exceeded his powers, and
the court corrected the award by striking the offending remedies. 33
A sharply divided California Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeal.34 Although the majority acknowledged that courts have the
"ultimate" power to overturn "unauthorized" remedies,35 its interpre-
tation of the scope of arbitral authority was surprisingly broad. The
majority held that "the remedy an arbitrator fashions does not exceed
his or her powers if it bears a rational relationship to the underlying
contract as interpreted, expressly or impliedly, by the arbitrator and to
the breach of the contract found, expressly or impliedly, by the arbi-
trator. ' 36 The majority identified the "critical question with regard to
remedies" as "whether the remedy chosen is rationally drawn from
the contract as ... interpreted [by the arbitrator]." 37 The court ex-
plained that a reviewing court must consider the source of the remedy:
if the award is based upon the agreement as interpreted by the arbi-
trator, it survives review; if it "derives from some extrinsic source," it
must be overturned. 38 The court held that the relationship of the
award to the agreement and breach need only be "rational" and that
the contractual terms at issue may be either (1) expressly interpreted
by the arbitrator, (2) implied by the award itself, or (3) "a plausible
theory of the contract's general subject matter, framework or in-
tent. '3 9 The court instructed that if parties desire to restrict an arbi-
trator's remedial powers, they "would be well advised to set out such
limitations explicitly and unambiguously in the arbitration clause."'40
Applying the new standard of review to the instant case, the court
upheld the arbitrator's award.41 The court found that the intellectual
property rights and two-year contract extension awarded to AMD
were rationally related to the contract and breach as interpreted by
the arbitrator.42 The majority rejected the court of appeal's reasoning
that the award violated the underlying contract by granting rights to
32. Id. at 79.
33. Id. at 79-80. The effect of the correction was to leave AMD $1 in damages for the
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See ia. at 75.
34. AMD, 885 P.2d 994, 1012 (Cal. 1994).
35. Id. at 1002.
36. Id. at 996; see id. at 1005-06.
37. Id. at 1003.
38. Id. at 1006 (citing United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 597 (1960); United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)).
39. Id. at 1005 (citing Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 768 F.2d 180, 184,
186 (7th Cir. 1985)).
40. Id. at 1007.
41. Id. at 1012. The court noted that there were no special limitations set upon the
arbitrator's remedial power. Id. at 1007.
42. Id at 1008-09.
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an "unearned" product, and found that the remedy was rationally
fashioned to enable AMD to recover from the effects of Intel's breach
of the implied covenants.43 The majority endorsed the view that arbi-
trators enjoy greater flexibility than courts in determining remedies."
The dissent would have added to the majority's "rational rela-
tionship" test a "scope-of-available-remedies" test;45 i.e., the arbitra-
tor's award must "fall within the range of remedies that a court could
award for the same claim."'46 The dissent also rejected application of
the "essence" test from the labor arbitration realm to commercial ar-
bitration.47 The dissent noted that it would have overturned the dis-
puted portions of the award because it was comprised of equitable
relief other than the normal contract remedy of specific
performance. 48
This case presented several of the classic problems in reviewing
arbitration remedies: (1) What are permissible grounds for judicial
review of an arbitral award? (2) What level of deference must a court
grant an arbitrator's findings and determinations? (3) When have ar-
bitrators "exceeded their powers"? (4) When does a remedy not
"draw its essence" from the parties' agreement? (5) How may courts
further the policy of arbitral finality while declining to enforce imper-
missible arbitral remedies?
11. Statutory Grounds for Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards
Arbitration awards, standing alone, have only the force of a con-
tract and are not self-enforcing. 49 If necessary, the recipient of a
favorable arbitral determination must seek "confirmation" of the
award in court; an award duly confirmed has the effect of a civil judg-
ment.50 Similarly, a disappointed party may seek to have the award
"vacated" or "corrected" by the court. The grounds for correction or
43. Id. at 1009.
44. Id. at 1012.
45. Id. at 1018 n.5.
46. Id. at 1013 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 1018.
48. Id. at 1020.
49. E.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1287.6 (Deering 1993); Mandel, supra note 9, at
507.
50. E.g., CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1287.4 (Deering 1993). In this manner, courts be-
come instruments to further the arbitrator's determinations. For this reason, some judges
find judicial confirmation of substantially unjust awards unacceptable. See Moncharsh v.
Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 919-24 (Cal. 1992) (Kennard, J., joined by Mosk, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that courts should not be agents of injustice by
confirmation of an award that on its face is legally erroneous and results in substantial
injustice).
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vacatur have been legislatively enumerated. In many jurisdictions, the
grounds for judicial review are deemed exclusively statutory.5' The
typical statutes providing review are heavily skewed towards relief for
procedural defects rather than substantive unfairness: 52 e.g., corrup-
tion, fraud, partiality, misconduct, or other undue means in procuring
the award, unreasonable refusal to postpone a hearing or hear mate-
rial evidence, or correction of evident miscalculation or imperfection
as to form.53 The statutory ground most susceptible to substantive re-
view of arbitral determinations-including the choice of remedy-is
the provision permitting vacatur when the arbitrators "exceeded their
powers." 54
A. The Parameters of "Excess of Powers"
It is well settled in California that arbitrators do not exceed their
powers (or "authority") by deciding the "merits" of the dispute erro-
neously. Since the merits "include all the contested issues of law and
fact submitted to the arbitrator for decision," 55 courts refuse to re-
51. E.g., Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 914-15 (citing jurisdictions in accord: Arizona, Flor-
ida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Ne-
vada, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Dakota, Utah and Wisconsin); accord
Malekzadeh v. Wyshock, 611 A.2d 18, 20-21 (Del. Ch. 1992). But see Sperry Int'l Trade,
Inc. v. Government of Israel, 689 F.2d 301, 304-05 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting that "in addition
[to statutory grounds of review], an award may be set aside on 'the nonstatutory ground of
"manifest disregard" of the law') (quoting Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 352 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 948 (1978)).
52. See Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 905; Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of La-
bor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and its Progeny, 75 MicH. L.
REv. 1137, 1160 (1977) (concluding, inter alia, that "[a] court asked to review or enforce an
arbitral award can relax about the merits.... The only conditions are procedural, not
substantive-jurisdiction, authority, honesty, fairness, and basic rationality.").
53. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); CA±. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 1286.2,
1286.6 (Deering 1993); UNIF. ARBITRATION Acr § 12, 7 U.L.A. 140 (1956) (adopted by
more than half of the states as noted in Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 914-15).
54. E.g., 9 U.S.C. § 10(d); CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 1286.2(d); UNIF. ARBITRATION
ACr § 12(a)(3), 7 U.L.A. at 140.
Although not pertinent to the discussion of this Note, courts will also overturn awards
that are illegal or contrary to public policy; these grounds have been discussed at length
elsewhere. See REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CorNRAcrs § 178(1) (1979) ("A promise or
other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation pro-
vides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the
circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of such terms."); St. Antoine,
supra note 52, at 1155-57; Note, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Role of Public Policy,
58 Nw. U. L. Rv. 545 (1964). See generally United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco,
Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42-48 (1987) (noting that an arbitrator has exceeded his or her power
when their decision contravenes public policy). Arguably, if an arbitrator makes an award
in contravention of law or public policy, he exceeds his powers, thus coming within the
statutory proscription. See Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. United Transp. Union, 6
Cal. Rptr. 2d 804, 807 (Ct. App. 1992).
55. Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 916.
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view contested issues of "law or fact. ' 56 Accordingly, an arbitrator's
reasoning,57 or allegations regarding the sufficiency of evidence,5 8 are
also not subject to review under the "excess of powers" provision. In
curtailing a court's powers to review arbitral determinations of law or
fact, the arbitration process dramatically departs from that of review
of trial court decisions.5 9 This policy of limited judicial review is a
56. Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349 (1855).
Arbitrators are judges chosen by the parties to decide the matters submitted to
them, finally and without appeal. As a mode of settling disputes it should receive
every encouragement from courts of equity. If the award is within the submis-
sion, and contains the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hear-
ing of the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error either in law or
fact. A contrary course would be a substitution of the judgment of the Chancellor
in place of the judges chosen by the parties, and would make an award the com-
mencement, not the end, of litigation.
Id. at 349; see also United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,596
(1960) ("The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper
approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements. The federal policy of set-
tling labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say on the
merits of the awards.").
The awards of arbitrators are not subject to judicial review for errors of law or of
fact. Nor should there be the control which would flow from the exercise of such
power of review. Submissions are for determinations based on the ad hoc appli-
cation of broad principles of justice and fairness in the particular instance. Reli-
ance is not placed on continuity of tribunal personnel or operation. Predictability
is not an objective and awards do not have, nor is it intended that they should
have, the precedential value that we attach to judicial determinations.
SCM Corp. v. Fisher Park Lane Co., 358 N.E.2d 1024, 1028 (N.Y. 1976).
57. Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 916 ("It is well settled that 'arbitrators do not exceed their
powers merely because they assign an erroneous reason for their decision."' (quoting
O'Malley v. Petroleum Maintenance Co., 308 P.2d 9, 12 (Cal. 1957)); see Misco, 484 U.S. at
37-38 ("Because the parties have contracted to have disputes settled by an arbitrator cho-
sen by them rather than by a judge, it is the arbitrator's view of the facts and of the mean-
ing of the contract that they have agreed to accept.").
58. E.g., Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 904.
59. Misco, 484 U.S. at 38 ("Courts thus do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal
error by an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing decision of lower courts.").
Many courts, however, have carved out an exception for the nonreviewability of legal
error, and will vacate an award for "manifest disregard of the law." See, e.g., Todd Ship-
yards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 1991).
Manifest disregard has proved to be a troubling and rather unworkable standard.
Writes Oehmke, "[w]hen 'misinterpretation of law' becomes so serious and grave that it is
elevated to the plateau of 'manifest disregard of law,' an award may be vacated. [It is]
beyond and different from a mere error in the law, or failure of the arbitrator to under-
stand or apply the law." THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 4:28, at 103-
04 (1987 & Supp. 1993). In 1961, the Ninth Circuit understood that "manifest disregard"
might be defined as "when arbitrators understand and correctly state the law, but proceed
to disregard the same." San Martine Compania de Navegacion S.A. v. Saguenay Termi-
nals, Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 800-01 (9th Cir. 1961); see OEHMKE, supra, § 4:28, at 104.
Other courts are unable to let stand an award that they find so egregiously unfair as to
be "utterly irrational." E.g., Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. DePaola, 554 N.Y.S.2d 835 (App. Div.
1916 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
concession to the arbitral process for making determinations based
upon "principles of equity and good conscience" and awards "ex ae-
quo et bono [according to what is just and good]" 60 rather than a
court's strict legal rules.
Confounding any attempt to review an arbitrator's determina-
tions is the lack of a requirement to articulate findings or reasoning in
the arbitrator's awards.61 Thus, "arbitrators may render a lump sum
award without disclosing their rationale for it."62 For example, an
award for "$50,000 to Party A from Party B on X date" is presumably
legally sufficient for judicial enforcement. 63 Although not requiring
clear articulations of findings may seem to frustrate practical judicial
review,64 courts recognize the impropriety of establishing such a re-
quirement: "[t]o require opinions free of ambiguity may lead arbitra-
tors to play it safe by writing no supporting opinions. This would be
undesirable because a well-reasoned opinion tends to engender confi-
dence in the integrity of the process and aids in clarifying the underly-
ing agreement. '65 In the interests of finality and to eliminate possible
1990). One commentator has "reluctantly" accepted the judicial standard of setting aside
an "irrational" arbitral award, reasoning that parties agree not only to final and binding
awards "untainted by fraud or corruption," but they also assume that the arbitrator "would
not be insane and that his decisions would not be totally irrational." St. Antoine, supra
note 52, at 1149. Similarly, denial of awards "tainted by partiality or corruption" is appro-
priate since they are, "in effect, not the award of an 'honest' intellect." Kaden, supra note
4, at 297. Further.
Perhaps it is foolhardy to expect judges who daily interpret and apply standards
codified in contracts, regulations, and statutes to stand aside and enforce interpre-
tations of collective bargaining agreements that seem to them excessively far off
the mark. In any event, it is apparent that this judicial instinct will not be stifled
by incantations of finality, or by still more verbal formulations of the proper
scope of review... [I]t may be unrealistic to expect a court to place its authority
behind an award without any scrutiny of its merits. However potent the forces
constraining judicial review, the courts' temptation to reverse outrageous arbitral
excess is likely to be irresistible.
Id at 274, 297.
60. Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 904 (quoting Muldrow v. Norris, 2 Cal. 74, 77 (1852)).
61. OEHMYE, supra note 59, § 3:28, at 57; see United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960).
62. Koch Oil, S.A. v. Transocean Gulf Oil Co., 751 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir. 1985).
63. See OEHMICE, supra note 59, § 3:29, at 57; Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 904 (quoting
Case v. Alperson, 5 Cal. Rptr. 635, 636-37 (Ct. App. 1960) (noting that parties submitting
to arbitration are "bound by an award reached by paths neither marked nor traceable and
not subject to judicial review").
64. Hall v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 377 (Ct. App. 1993); see Memphis
Dist. of Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 984, 946 F.2d 895 (Table),
141 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2984, No.90-5933, 1991 WL 203110, at *1-3 (6th. Cir 1991) (unpub-
lished), affg 785 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Tenn. 1990).
65. Enterprise Whee4 363 U.S. at 598 (citing Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The
Judicial Attitude, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 519, 522 (1960)); see also Malekzadeh v. Wyshock, 611
A.2d 18, 22 (Del. Ch. 1992).
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problems in this regard, arbitrators are in fact advised not to explain
their awards.66 Hence, courts resign themselves to inferring grounds
for relief from the award itself, in order to deem the award "within the
scope of the Arbitrator's authority. ' 67
While courts do not review the merits of a dispute under the "ex-
cess of powers" provision, the concepts of arbitral "subject matter ju-
risdiction" and remedial authority do come within its purview.68 Thus,
arbitrators exceed their authority if they decide an issue not submitted
to them,69 fashion "impermissible" remedies,70 or otherwise exceed
their authority "as defined in the Constitution, statutes, or judicial de-
cisions."' 71 Although the questions of submission to arbitration and
corresponding remedial power are related,72 it is important that the
two are initially subject to separate analysis under "excess of power."
Thus, a reviewing court's threshold question should be whether the
arbitrator improperly determined an unsubmitted issue. A much dif-
ferent scenario arises when the arbitrator has decided the merits of a
properly submitted dispute but has fashioned an impermissible rem-
edy in response. In both cases, the court should must either vacate the
entire award, or if possible, strike only its offending portions. 73 Un-
fortunately, in analyzing these issues, courts and commentators have
tended to "put the cart before the horse" by blending the threshold
submission question into the remedial authority issue, without recog-
nizing the lineal process of analysis.74 A typical analysis states,
66. E.g., Oehmke, supra note 59, § 3:29, at 57-58 ("The operating premise is: less is
more!").
67. Malekzadeh, 611 A.2d at 22 (citations omitted); see also AMD, 885 P.2d 994, 1005-
06 (Cal. 1994).
68. AMD, 885 P.2d at 1000.
69. Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. North Am. Towing, Inc., 607 F.2d 649,651 (5th
Cir. 1979); Blue Cross v. Jones, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 359, 362 (Ct. App. 1993); Malekzadeh, 611
A.2d at 21 (citing Coast Trading Co. v. Pacific Molasses Co., 681 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir.
1982).
The issue of arbitrability is not often problematic in the commercial arbitration con-
text because of broad arbitration clauses covering "any dispute arising under" the underly-
ing contract. E.g., Todd Shipyards, 943 F.2d at 1060; AMD, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
70. See, e.g., AMD, 885 P.2d at 1002-03.
71. Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 924 (Cal. 1992) (Kennard, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 813 P.2d
240, 244 (Cal. 1991)); see also St. Antoine, supra note 52, at 1151 (stating that with respect
to arbitral jurisdiction or authority, "[a]rbitrators are subject to the mandate of the parties
not only with regard to 'subject matter' jurisdiction, but also with regard to the capacity to
fashion a particular remedy.").
72. See AMD, 885 P.2d at 999-1000 (noting deference due to arbitrator's determina-
tion of arbitrability, and lack of distinction in arbitration statute between judicial review of
arbitrability and remedial discretion).
73. See id. at 1000.
74. Such mistakes are understandable: "With regard to a court's authority to grant an
equitable remedy, the line between 'subject matter' jurisdiction and remedial powers has
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"[a]lthough arbitrators enjoy a broad grant of authority to fashion
remedies . . . arbitrators are restricted to those issues submitted."75
The focus of the present discussion is solely whether an arbitral rem-
edy exceeds an arbitrator's powers.
Enforcement statutes clearly state that an award is set aside if the
court determines that an arbitrator exceeded his or her powers.76
Thus, whether an arbitrator's choice of remedy was within his or her
authority is a matter for judicial determination, and not for the un-
checked discretion of the arbitrator.77 A stipulation that "the Arbitra-
tor may grant any remedy or relief which the Arbitrator deems just
and equitable" does not vest complete power of remedial determina-
tion in the arbitrator; the rule speaks only to the arbitrators and par-
ties within a dispute and does not, in and of itself, purport to bind the
court. The courts' own struggle regarding the scope of judicial power
to review arbitral remedial authority was aptly described by a Califor-
nia court of appeal before the AMD decision:
[T]he law has not found a position of repose on the question of
judicial review. That, in part, is attributable to misgivings about the
propriety of assigning a completely unreviewable power to private
persons to authorize an award that is judicially enforceable. The
fundamental purpose of a written contract is to subject, insofar as
feasible, the jural consequences of future events to a written stan-
dard. If the arbitrators are completely cut loose from these contrac-
tual moorings, they may impose, through judicial enforcement of
the award, any remedy, however fantastic, excepting only those that
are illegal per se. The policy which favors the finality of an arbitra-
tion award should not be nor need not be extended to this
extreme.78
B. Determining the Meaning of "Excess of Powers"
This Note now turns to the analysis of the substantive issue plagu-
ing the courts: when has an arbitrator "exceeded" remedial powers?
undoubtedly been obscured by the fact that historically the 'system of equity' derived its
doctrines, as well as its powers, from its mode of giving relief." Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 404 n.5 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). However, to simply assert that the fashioning of appropriate relief is itself a
"submitted issue" improperly collapses the analyses, and the circularity of this assertion
would not further the present discussion.
75. Totem Marine Thg & Barge, Inc. v. North Am. Towing, Inc., 607 F.2d 649,651 (5th
Cir. 1979) (citing AMERICAN ARBrrRATION AssOcATION, COMMER&AL ARBrrRTON
RuLES, Rule 42 (now Rule 43)).
76. See e.g., CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE §§ 1286.2, 1286.6 (Deering 1993).
77. AMD, 885 P.2d at 1002.
78. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. [PG&E] v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295, 305
(Ct. App. 1993). As aptly noted in 1922, "when two separate and partially competing juris-
dictions exist in one state, a conflict between them is sooner or later inevitable." 1 W.
HoLDSwORTH, A ISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 459 (3d ed. 1922).
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The question is important for courts, arbitrators, and commercial par-
ties alike. Indeed, as one court has noted, "for a court to enforce an
award that clearly is beyond the arbitrator's power denies the parties
of the benefit of their bargaining just as surely as overturning an
award because the court disagrees with the decision's legal or factual
basis." 79
This section begins with a brief discussion of remedial purpose,
and the propriety of guidance from labor arbitration cases, before ex-
plaining the basic parameters of arbitral authority.
(1) General Principles from the Law of Remedies
Although review of a dispute's merits is an issue distinct from
review of the corresponding remedy, the remedy is nevertheless the
"means of carrying into effect the substantive right."80 Because "the
remedy should reflect the right or the policy behind that right as pre-
cisely as possible," 81 the reviewing court must delve into the merits of
the case far enough to ascertain those substantive rights the arbitrator
may have arguably determined. A remedy is then selected, appropri-
ately measured, and ideally should not "go far beyond the plaintiff's
bargained for right."82 Thus, a court reviewing an arbitration award
might be asked to determine: (1) the substantive rights properly sub-
mitted to and decided by the arbitrator, such as breach of contract;
(2) whether the selected remedy arguably reflects that right, e.g.,
money damages; and (3) the arguable propriety of the measure of the
remedy, such as the monetary amount awarded.
An important corollary to the above principles serves as guidance
to reviewing courts: the one fashioning the remedy is, ideally, inti-
mately familiar with the substantive law and policies affecting the un-
derlying right.83 Hence, arbitrators chosen for their expertise and
familiarity in a particular field may be trusted, to a certain extent, to
fashion appropriate relief.84 Discontent parties who convince courts
that the right and remedy did not correlate may have clouded the is-
sues by focusing attention on the "defective" remedy, rather than the
right as determined by the arbitrator.85
79. Carpenter Local No. 1027 v. Lee Lumber & Bldg. Material Corp., 2 F.3d 796, 798
(7th Cir. 1993).
80. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.7, at 22 (1993).
81. Id. § 1.7, at 23. But see AMD, 885 P.2d at 1006 (noting that an arbitrator's remedy
need not correspond exactly to a party's rights had the contract been performed).
82. DOBBS, supra note 80, § 1.7, at 23.
83. Id.
84. See AMD, 885 P.2d at 1001 (noting that the parties have "a contractual expecta-
tion of a [remedial] decision according to the arbitrators' best judgment").
85. See id. § 1.7, at 24-26.
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(2) The Propriety of Guidance from Labor Arbitration Cases
In examining the commercial arbitrator's remedial authority, it is
instructive, although not dispositive, to look to labor arbitration cases
and their determinations. Numerous courts reviewing commercial ar-
bitration awards have looked to labor arbitration for guidance.86 It is
important, however, to acknowledge some of the significant differ-
ences between labor and commercial arbitration. First, commercial
arbitration is an efficient substitute for litigation while labor arbitra-
tion is an alternative to "industrial strife," such as strikes.87 Labor
arbitration may be viewed as "only part of a larger collective bargain-
ing process"88 or "system of industrial self-government, '8 9 while com-
mercial arbitration is a "one shot deal" for resolving a particular
dispute.90 Accordingly, labor arbitrators' decisions must take into ac-
count that the parties' relationship must "function smoothly in the fu-
ture"91 while commercial arbitrators tend only to resolve past
disputes. Finally, unlike commercial arbitration, labor arbitration may
not strive to interpret the parties' agreement as much as it serves "as
an organic extension, a fulfillment, a flowering of the seed it
planted."9"
Despite the above differences, courts, such as the majority in
AMD,93 and commentators borrow some remedial analysis from labor
cases for application to the commercial arbitration context. One fer-
86. E.g., AMD, 885 P.2d at 1003-04 (borrowing test from United Steelworkers v. En-
terprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)); see also Richard P. Hackett, Note,
Punitive Damages in Arbitration: the Search for a Workable Rule, 63 CORNELL L. Rnv.
272, 291 (1978) (noting that federal courts, confronted with commercial cases, have been
willing to take lessons from labor law).
87. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578, 581
(1960); see David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61
CAL. L. REv. 663,745-47 (1973); David E. Feller, The Remedy Power in Grievance Arbitra-
tion, 5 INDUs. REL. L.J. 128, 132 (1982) (citing United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 578 (dicta)).
88. Michael L. Collyer, Note, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: The Second Circuit on
a Collision Course with the U.S. Supreme Court, 8 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 385, 395
(1993).
89. AMD, 885 P.2d at 1017 (Kennard, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 581).
90. Collyer, supra note 88, at 395; accord Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys.,
Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding labor cases limiting punitive damages reme-
dies to express contractual authorization inapplicable to commercial cases). But see AMD,
885 P.2d at 1004 (noting that commercial as well as labor disputes may involve extended,
complex dealings).
91. Mandel, supra note 9, at 510 n.23. For this reason, punitive damages in labor
arbitration cases are often disallowed unless expressly provided for by the parties.
92. St. Antoine, supra note 52, at 1139; see United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco,
484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987); AMD, 885 P.2d at 1005-06.
93. 885 P.2d at 1003-05.
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tile source of labor arbitration policy often cited is known as the Steel-
workers Trilogy.94
(3) Sources and Limits of Arbitral Authority
The question of the scope of an arbitrator's general powers, and
more specifically, the arbitrator's remedial powers, is rooted in the
sources from which the powers stem, and the limits placed upon them.
On a broad scale, arbitral powers are limited by federal and state con-
stitutions; awards deemed violative of these constitutions are accord-
ingly invalid. Further, arbitrators are prohibited from issuing awards
that are violative of public policy, or are illegal (as distinct from being
based upon erroneous application of law). 95 While these limitations
bring an attendant body of concerns, the most complex determination
of the scope of arbitral remedial power requires interpretation of the
particular parties' agreement. 96
The agreements between the parties in arbitration both grant ar-
bitral authority-including remedial power-and limit it.97  The
agreements granting authority are (1) the arbitration agreement,
which may be found within the underlying contract from which the
dispute arose; (2) the written submission to the arbitrators of the dis-
puted issues; and (3) arbitration rules.98 The arbitrator's powers are
derived from, and must be found, in the context of these sources. 99 A
leading arbitration authority states:
[T]he arbitrator is empowered to decide[ ] all issues (whether ques-
tion [of] fact or law) presented, and fairly remedy the problem-
unless otherwise restricted from doing so, in any specific way, by the
language of the arbitration agreement. This basis requires that the
94. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
95. See AMD, 885 P.2d at 1010.
96. See Yarowsky, supra note 11, at 958 ("Lack of power may flow from external
limitations imposed by law, or internal ones embodied in the contractual agreement.").
97. See Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 902 (Cal. 1992) (quoting Ericksen,
Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street, 673 P.2d 251 (Cal. 1983));
accord Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. North Am. Towing, Inc., 607 F.2d 649, 651 (5th
Cir. 1979) ("Arbitration is contractual and arbitrators derive their authority from the scope
of the contractual agreement.") (citing Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597); Kaden, supra
note 4, at 275 ("[T]he parties have an institutional stake in finality because the arbitrator is
their creation; he functions by their consent and at their sufferance, and his powers and
roles can and should be molded by them to suit their own purposes.").
98. See AMD, 885 P.2d at 996.
99. See id at 1002; Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. United Transp. Union, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 804, 807 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing Hacienda Hotel v. Culinary Workers Union, 223
Cal. Rptr. 305, 306 (Ct. App. 1985)).
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arbitration agreement (and related documents) be compared to the
award.1 o
Typically, commercial parties incorporate the American Arbitra-
tion Association's Commercial Arbitration Rule 43 ("Rule 43") in
their arbitration agreement. The pertinent section of Rule 43 reads,
"[t]he Arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that the Arbitrator
deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the
parties."'u 0 Some courts have found that this rule distinguishes com-
mercial from labor arbitration with its broad grant of remedial
power.102 The qualification incorporated in Rule 43, "within the
scope of the agreement of the parties," conforms to the notion that
the parties' underlying contract serves to limit arbitral remedial
power.
In the interest of arbitral finality, courts are admonished to gener-
ously view the scope of an arbitrator's authority. In the labor context,
the United States Supreme Court stated in one of the Steelworkers
Trilogy cases:
[A]n arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the collective
bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear
in order to reach a fair solution of a problem. This is especially true
when it comes to formulating remedies. There the need is for flexi-
bility in meeting a wide variety of situations. The draftsmen may
never have thought of what specific remedy should be awarded to
meet a particular contingency. 10 3
There is no shortage of judicial proclamations respecting this defer-
ence to the arbitrator's determination of the scope of his or her au-
thority. 0 4 This judicial concession is necessary both to allow
100. OEHMKE, supra note 59, § 4:28, at 101 (emphasis added).
101. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 23, Rule 43, at 17.
102. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1062-63 (9th Cir.
1991) (finding that although punitive damages may not be awarded in labor arbitration
cases unless a contract expressly provides, Rule 43 permits awarding of punitive damages
in the commercial arbitration context).
103. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
104. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29,38 (1987) ("[W]here it
is contemplated that the arbitrator will determine remedies for [the] contract violations
that he finds, courts have no authority to disagree with his honest judgment in that respect.
If the courts were free to intervene on these grounds, the speedy resolution of grievances
by private mechanisms would be greatly undermined."); Anderman/Smith Operating Co.
v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 918 F.2d 1215, 1218 (5th Cir. 1990) ("The standard of re-
view is thus a very deferential one. This Court must sustain arbitration awards even if it
does not agree with the arbitrators' interpretation of the contract"), cert. denied, 501 U.S.
1206 (1991); Willoughby Roofing v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 776 F.2d 269, 270 (11th Cir. 1985)
(recognizing a court's obligation "to resolve all doubt in favor of the arbitrator's authority
to award a particular remedy") (emphasis added), affg 598 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala. 1984);
AMD, 885 P.2d at 1003-04; Lauria v. Soriano, 4 Cal. Rptr. 328,331 (Ct. App. 1960), quoted
in Luster v. Collins, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 215, 218-19 (Ct. App. 1993) ("'[E]very reasonable
intendment must be indulged in favor of the award."').
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flexibility in arbitral dispute resolution'0 5 and to give effect to the pol-
icy of arbitral finality.10 6 Thus, courts resolve any doubts in favor of
an arbitrator's remedial authority.107 This position is also encouraged
by the fact that arbitrators need not articulate explanations for
awards. 08 Without details surrounding the award before them, courts
find difficulty in determining "the parameters" of the award. 0 9 With-
out requisite findings, it seems sound doctrine that a remedy be up-
held "[i]f a legally correct explanation of [it] is conceivable."'" 0
However, absolute deference to arbitrators is not appropriate. After
105. Two examples from the Sixth Circuit are instructive:
It is implicit in the Agreement and in accord with the interest of both parties that
the arbitrator view the Agreement in the realistic light of the history which
brought it about. In conclusion, then, the arbitrator's award here was perhaps
unusual and even bizarre, but it was related to arguably proper compensatory
damages and thus found its essence in the terms of the Agreement.... [W]here
conduct of one party is arguably subject to arbitration, we will defer to the arbi-
trator's authority to fashion a unique remedy, where the remedy does not appear
to have been expressly barred by the collective bargaining agreement, and where
the remedy is at least arguably supported by equitable considerations which arise
from the essence of the collective bargaining Agreement itself and the history of
its development as seen by the proofs before the arbitrator.
Local 120, Int'l Molders & Allied Workers Union v. Brooks Foundry, Inc., 892 F.2d 1283,
1288, 1290 (6th Cir. 1990).
[The] mandate clearly is that in interpreting... [an] agreement and in fashioning
a remedy in accordance with that agreement, an arbitrator is given broad latitude
and discretion. His remedy need not be specifically authorized by the agreement.
And, so long as his remedy represents a fair solution to the dispute, the remedy
awarded should be affirmed. Reviewing courts should be extremely reluctant to
substitute their interpretation of the agreement for that of the arbitrator.... [Hlis
awards should be upheld so long as he does not disregard or modify plain and
unambiguous provisions of ... [the] agreement.
General Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers of Am., 648 F.2d 452, 457 (6th Cir. 1981).
106. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597 (regarding flexibility in formulating remedies));
Willoughby Roofing, 598 F. Supp. at 357 (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mer-
cury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) (regarding arbitrability)).
107. Misco, 484 U.S. at 38 ("[Als long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or
applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced
he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.").
The task of judicial review in cases such as this is never an easy one for a trial or
appellate court. The facts of this case graphically illustrates the fine line between
formulating remedies appropriate for a particular breach and imposing one's own
brand of industrial justice. We recognize also that it does not ease the task of a
trial judge for an appellate court to reach a contrary conclusion with the observa-
tion that each decision must necessarily be based upon application of relevant law
to the unique facts before the court. If there is a principle therefore to be drawn
in our reversal here, it is our conclusion following Misco that in close cases such
as this, the decision of the arbitrator must be accorded controlling respect.
Local 120, 892 F.2d at 1289.
108. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
109. Sullivan, supra note 12, at 1137.
110. Hackett, supra note 86, at 297.
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all, "[t]he Constitution vests the judicial power of the United States in
the federal courts, not in arbitrators." ''
Im. The Scope of Arbitral Remedial Authority
Having thus established that arbitrators are limited by the parties'
agreements, and that courts are in general highly deferential toward
arbitral remedial decisions, the next question is how and to what ex-
tent an arbitrator is permitted to fashion relief. Most commercial ar-
bitration agreements contain expansive clauses covering any dispute
arising out of the contract or related transaction.112 Once the arbitra-
tor determines the substantive rights of the parties arising from the
contract, and within the context of the dispute, the arbitrator must
then fashion corresponding relief."3 When determining a party's con-
tractual rights, the arbitrator typically has "broad" authority "con-
cerning the composition, meaning, and scope of that agreement.""14
Since this contract interpretation would seem to fall within the "mer-
its" of a dispute, this acknowledgment of authority is not too surpris-
ing. However, the exact scope of the "broad" power in relation to
remedies has varied with the facts of each case, and has been deter-
mined by inconsistent standards.
Common verbal incantations explaining arbitral remedial powers
include: the arbitrator may not make an award that contradicts the
express language of the agreement;" 5s an award is impermissible if
"the arbitrators' interpretation or application of a contract is com-
pletely outside its scope";116 "[t]he arbitrator may not ignore the plain
language of the contract[,] but [assuming that the parties] authorized
the arbitrator to give meaning to the language of the agreement, a
court should not reject an award on the ground that the arbitrator
misread the contract.""17 As may be expected, exactly when the arbi-
trator crosses the line from merely "misreading" the contract to "ig-
noring" its plain language is somewhat of a mystery. Even more
creative is the notion that "a decision exceeds the arbitrator's powers
only if it is so utterly irrational that it amounts to an arbitrary remak-
111. Bret F. Randall, Comment, The History, Application, and Policy of the Judicially
Created Standards of Review for Arbitration Awards, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 759, 759 (1992).
112. See, eg., Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.
1991); AMD, 885 P.2d 994, 997 (Cal. 1994).
113. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
114. Todd Shipyards, 943 F.2d at 1060.
115. United Steelworkers of Am. v. USX Corp., 966 F.2d 1394, 1403 (11th Cir. 1992),
cerL denied, 113 S. Ct. 1386 (1993).
116. Blue Cross v. Jones, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 359, 364 (Ct. App. 1993).
117. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).
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ing of the contract between the parties."11 8 Does this standard mean
that an arbitrator may "remake" the contract as long as it is not "arbi-
trarily" done? One court has attempted to give some meaning to the
"arbitrary remaking" standard: when "the arbitrators' reading and
application of the contract is clearly within the range of ambiguity, i.e.,
within the ordinary bounds of semantic permissibility, there can be no
tenable claim that the contract has been arbitrarily remade."11 9 Last,
some courts have looked to the "foreseeability" of the remedy to de-
termine its permissibility: "When a collective bargaining agreement
neither mentions a specific remedy nor contains language from which
that remedy can be 'fairly implied,' a court must consider 'whether it
is at all plausible to suppose that the remedy devised was within the
contemplation of the parties and hence implicitly authorized by the
agreement.' 120
The above formulae have either derived from, or have now been
subsumed within the seminal standard of review for arbitrators'
awards: the "essence" test of United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp.121 In an oft-quoted passage, the Court wrote:
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the
collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own
brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance
from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it
draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When
the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts
have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award. 122
118. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. United Transp. Union, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 804,
807 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing Posner v. Grunwald-Marx, Inc., 363 P.2d 313 (Cal. 1961); see
also Summit Indus. Equip., Inc. v. Koll/Wells Bay Area, 230 Cal. Rptr. 565, 571 (Ct. App.
1986)); accord Blue Cross, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 362 (when "the arbitrators are considered to
have 'rewritten' the agreement of the parties"); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. [PG&E] v. Supe-
rior Court, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295, 306 (Ct. App. 1993) (authorizing judicial intervention
where the arbitrator's "application or construction of the contract presents such an egre-
gious mistake that it amounts to an arbitrary remaking of the contract between the par-
ties"). The AMD majority concluded that the "arbitrary remaking" test for judicial review
of arbitral remedial power was "incomplete." AMD, 885 P.2d 994, 1003 (Cal. 1994) (re-
jecting as well the "completely irrational" test).
119. PG&E, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 307-08.
120. Carpenter Local No. 1027 v. Lee Lumber & Bldg. Material Corp., 2 F.3d 796, 798
(7th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added) (quoting Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewer Workers Local
No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1164 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985)). But see
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960) (holding
that unforeseeability of a remedy is not grounds for vacating the award).
121. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
122. Id. at 597.
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This articulation of arbitral power has at once been seized upon by
courts reviewing awards,'2 and criticized by both courts and commen-
tators.124 In an insightful passage which speaks to the topic of this
Note, one writer has criticized:
The judicial role is more ambiguous and difficult to define when it is
claimed that an arbitrator who decided a grievance clearly within
his jurisdiction exceeded his authority either in the type of remedy
he ordered or in the way he construed the agreement. This is the
circumstance that goes to the heart of the essence test of Enterprise
Wheel However, to say as the Court did in that case that the merits
of an arbitrator's reading of a contract must be respected so long as
his words show no infidelity to that contract does not really help.' 25
Courts have grappled with the meaning of the essence test with
various levels of clarity. Some extrapolate to various standards that
appear to authorize troublingly substantive review, contrary to arbi-
tral policy. By this standard, an award does not draw its essence from
the agreement if it "conflicts with express terms... imposes additional
requirements... [or] ... is without rational support... [in] the agree-
ment... [or] ... is based on general considerations of fairness and
equity instead of the precise terms of the agreement.' 26 Other courts
throw in the essence test "for good measure" while duly acknowledg-
ing the deferential review: e.g., "though the arbitrator's decision must
draw its essence from the agreement, he 'is to bring his informed judg-
ment to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a problem. This is
especially true when it comes to formulating remedies."' 27
Whenever an arbitrator misreads a contract, it is possible to say that
his award fails to draw its essence from the contract; that the ground
of the award is not the contract but the arbitrator's misreading. But
so long as the award is based on the arbitrator's interpretation-
123. See e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 768 F.2d 180, 184 (7th Cir.
1985); AMD, 885 P.2d at 1003-04; Screen Actors Guild v. A. Shane Co., 275 Cal. Rptr. 220,
223 (Ct. App. 1990).
124. See Kaden, supra note 4, at 270, 276 ("The problem with this articulation of the
limits of finality is that it provides little guidance as to the appropriate standard for judicial
review of arbitral awards." Further, "the lower courts have endeavored to formulate [the
'essence' test] ... with at best indifferent success .... "What has become known as the
'essence' test of Enterprise Wheel plainly does not elaborate reasons for finality sufficient
to describe either the circumstances in which the principle properly applies, or those in
which enforcement of an arbitrator's award may be denied." (citations omitted)); see Ethyl
Corp., 768 F.2d at 184; St. Antoine, supra note 52, at 1148.
125. Kaden, supra note 4, at 297 (emphasis added).
126. Dobbs, Inc. v. Local No. 614, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 813 F.2d 85, 86 (6th Cir.
1987) (quoting Cement Divs., Nat'l Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers, 793 F.2d 759, 766
(6th Cir. 1986)).
127. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29,41 (1987) (emphasis omit-
ted) (quoting Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597).
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unsound though it may be-of the contract, it draws its essence
from the contract.128
One court has simply concluded that an award that has not been
drawn from the essence of the agreement is illegal and therefore un-
enforceable. 129 Finally, the majority in AMD identified the essence
test as properly focusing on the source of the remedy, while fashioning
its own test in terms of a rational relationship to the contract as well as
to the breach. 130
While most of these standards lack principled clarity, at least the
deferential standards of the essence test are more consistent with the
policy of arbitral deference and finality. However, as one court has
aptly noted, it might have been better had the court "not said 'draw[ ]
its essence from the ...agreement,' arresting as this formulation
is... but instead had made the test simply whether the arbitrator had
exceeded the powers delegated to him by the parties.' 3' This sugges-
tion is preferable for at least two reasons. First, it keeps the standard
of review directly within the wording of the statute. 32 Second, it
shifts the focus away from the substantive review that courts may be
tempted to conduct using the essence test. 33
IV. The Need for Broad Arbitral Remedial Power
Redefining the issue of arbitral remedial authority-through the
essence test and its variations-and including it within the "excess of
power" wording of the statute is helpful, but requires a return to the
substantive issues. We are still left with a series of difficult questions.
For example, if a commercial arbitrator's award is unreviewable for
questions of law or fact, including contract interpretation, how may
principled review for the responsive relief granted be effected? Put
another way, if the arbitrator has absolute authority to determine the
substantive rights of the parties, how may courts determine whether
the arbitrator has exceeded his or her powers in fashioning the corre-
sponding remedies? Indeed, how may any review of remedy be ef-
fected when inquiry into its corresponding right is confounded by the
lack of an arbitral articulated-findings requirement? 134 These ques-
128. Ethyl Corp., 768 F.2d at 184.
129. United Steelworkers of Am. v. USX Corp., 966 F.2d 1394, 1400 (11th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1386 (1993).
130. AMD, 885 P.2d at 1003, 1005-06.
131. Ethyl Corp., 768 F.2d at 184 (emphasis added).
132. That is, instead of indirectly within the statute through the tortured path that arbi-
trators "exceed their powers" if their award does not "draw its essence" from the
agreement.
133. See Ethyl Corp., 768 F.2d at 184; St. Antoine, supra note 52, at 1148.
134. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
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tions support the conclusion that permitting broad arbitral remedial
authority is necessary.
A. The Arbitrator as "Contract Reader"
Shifting the focus of review from the merits of the dispute to the
arbitrator's granted powers is consistent with the insightful theory that
the arbitrator is the designated "contract reader.' 35 Under this prin-
ciple, the arbitrator is the parties' "joint alter ego" whose task is "to
handle the anticipated unanticipated omissions of the initial agree-
ment."1 36 Viewing the arbitrator as the contract reader, "the court
need have no qualms about enforcing an award that appears to the
court to be at odds with the parties' agreement.' 3 7 Thus, arbitral
"'misinterpretation' or 'gross mistake' ... becomes a contradiction in
terms.' 38 Taking the contract reader hypothesis one step further to
the question of remedies: "an arbitrator's sole remedial function is to
interpret and apply what the agreement says about remedy .... The
function of the arbitrator, as the parties' 'contract reader,' is to deter-
mine and award the remedy provided for by the agreement.' 39
Consistent with the contract reader theory, courts have permitted
arbitration awards that arguably conflict with the plain language of
agreements. However, allowing these awards seems proper, especially
when the question of the scope of the parties' agreement is actually
submitted to the arbitrator. This submission may include whether the
contract itself represents the "complete agreement of the parties.' 40
In interpreting the scope of the contract, the arbitrator is free to ad-
here to or reject legal rules, such as the parol evidence rule, since rules
of evidence need not apply.' 41 Hence, in SCM Corp., an award that
arguably "rewrote" the parties' agreement was allowed: "in the ab-
135. See St. Antoine, supra note 52, at 1140.
136. Id. at 1140 (diction so in original).
137. 1& at 1141.
138. Id. at 1140.
139. Feller, supra note 87, at 130 (emphasis added). Presumably, Feller intends that
emphasized phrase to mean the "agreement" as interpreted by the arbitrator, as well as
express or implied remedial provisions in the agreement. See idL at 134-35. Feller does not
explain, however, how a remedy for an unforeseeable breach might be "provided for by
the agreement." See id.
Although the AMD majority insists that the crucial question is not the arbitrator's
interpretation of the agreement, but rather whether the remedy rationally derives from the
agreement, such a focus ignores the inextricable relationship built within the court's test
between the remedy and the "contract as interpreted, expressly or impliedly." AMD, 885
P.2d 994, 996-1001 (Cal. 1994).
140. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.
1991).
141. Indeed, the arbitrator may be wise to at least hear, then disregard if desired, all
extrinsic evidence surrounding the contract, lest the award be overturned for the statutory
ground of refusal to hear material evidence. Moreover, even if an arbitration agreement
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sence of contrary public policy or an express provision in the arbitra-
tion agreement otherwise limiting his authority, the arbitrator of the
disputes between these parties would have the power to grant relief
which in the courts would be called reformation by rewriting the pro-
visions of the lease."' 42 Likewise, in AMD, the court upheld the arbi-
trator's award of a two-year extension of an agreement. 43
When the scope of the parties' agreement is not deemed a sub-'
mitted issue, an arbitrator's award may still do well to "reflect the
spirit rather than the letter of the agreement" even where the court
feels that "the arbitrator's interpretation disregards the apparent, or
even the plain, meaning of the words."' 44 Thus, when an award is
"rationally inferable from the language and purpose of the contract"
the courts may do well to uphold it.145 Cases like SCM Corp. and
AMD emphasize the power of the arbitrator as contract reader and
reveal the circular unworkability of the "essence of the agreement"
standard. As the official contract reader of the parties, the arbitrator's
choice of corresponding relief will arguably always "draw its essence"
from the agreement as "read" by the arbitrator.
B. Lessons from the Arbitral Punitive Damages Struggle
To a certain extent, lessons regarding general arbitral remedial
power may be gleaned from the courts' gradual acceptance of the spe-
cific arbitral remedy of punitive damages. 146 Some courts and com-
mentators had expressed reservations in permitting arbitrators to
award punitive damages. These critics typically argued that punitive
awards "undermine the entire arbitral process" because parties will
back away from such power, and courts will think it their duty to scru-
tinize it.147 A leading opinion rejecting such arbitral power is the 4-to-
3 decision in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.148 The Garrity majority held
stipulates to the use of law as a court would, any mistake of law in this regard would
presumably fall within the unreviewable "merits."
142. SCM Corp. v. Fisher Park Lane Co., 358 N.E.2d 1024, 1029 (N.Y. 1976) (citation
omitted). Cf id. at 1029-30 (Fuchsberg, J., concurring) (arguing that arbitrators do not
have the power to "rewrite" the parties' agreement by way of a contract reformation
remedy).
143. AMD, 885 P.2d at 1012.
144. Rochester City Sch. Dist. v. Rochester Teachers Ass'n, 362 N.E.2d 977, 981 (N.Y.
1977) (citation omitted).
145. See Anderman/Smith Operating Co. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 918 F.2d 1215,
1218-19 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1206 (1991); AMD, 885 P.2d at 1005.
146. This area has been extensively commentated elsewhere: e.g., Hackett, supra note
86; Stipanowich, supra note 9.
147. Sullivan, supra note 12, at 1127 (citing Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793
(N.Y. 1976)).
148. 353 N.E.2d at 794.
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that punitive damages are a sanction reserved to the states.149 Ac-
cordingly, courts choosing to vacate punitive damages awards have al-
ternately invoked the grounds that the relief was contrary to public
policy, or that the arbitrators exceeded their powers in granting it.150
The Garrity doctrine has been widely criticized, beyond the Gar-
rity dissent,' 51 by courts and commentators.1 52 One weakness with the
majority's rationale is that, although the decision purports to curtail
judicial activism in reviewing the award,' 53 it instead "invites greater
judicial encroachment upon the realm of the arbitrator by allowing
reviewing courts to speculate about the essential character of the
award."'154 This problem is further exacerbated by the lack of a re-
quirement of arbitral findings in the award.' 55 Similarly, new and cre-
ative grounds to review commercial arbitrator's remedies generally
further invade an arbitrator's determination of the merits.
Courts have increasingly rejected the Garrity principle and con-
firmed arbitral awards of punitive damages.' 56 In the commercial con-
text, a federal court astutely pointed out that arbitrators who are
familiar with a given industry are "better equipped than a judge" both
to pinpoint transgressions warranting punitive awards, and to deter-
mine the appropriate measure for the purposes of specific and general
deterrence. 57 Even more importantly, if an arbitrator has been
presented with a fraud or other tort claim, it is "anomalous," at best,
to deny the arbitral tool of corresponding punitive damages relief.' 58
In this regard, commercial arbitrators who hear cases under expansive
149. 1d. at 796.
150. Sullivan, supra note 12, at 1126.
151. Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 800 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
152. E.g., Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 1989);
J. Alexander Sec., Inc. v. Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 826 (Ct. App. 1993); Hackett, supra
note 86, at 274; Stipanowich, supra note 9, at 959.
153. Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 796.
154. Stipanowich, supra note 9, at 987.
155. See Hackett, supra note 86, at 274, 295; supra note 48 and accompanying text.
156. E.g., Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 287 (1993);
Willoughby Roofing v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353, 364 (N.D. Ala. 1984), affd, 776
F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985).
157. Willoughby Roofing, 598 F. Supp. at 360, 363. Note also that this case involved a
Construction Industry Arbitration Rule similar to Rule 43 for Commercial Arbitration,
allowing "any remedy or relief which is just and equitable and within the terms of the
agreement of the parties." 1d at 357 (citing Rule 43) (emphasis in original).
158. Accord Willoughby Roofing, 598 F. Supp. at 362 ("To deny arbitrators the full
range of remedial tools generally available under the law would be to hamstring arbitrators
and to lessen the value and efficiency of arbitration as an alternative method of dispute
resolution."); Stipanowich, supra note 9, at 999 ("Having thrust upon arbitrators the re-
sponsibility to adjudge unacceptable behavior in the form of fraud in the inducement,
breach of fiduciary duty, and various independent torts arising out of contractual relation-
ships, the judiciary should acknowledge arbitral remedial power commensurate with the
scope of arbitrability.").
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submission agreements should be allowed correspondingly broad
powers to fashion appropriate remedies.
This controversy over punitive damages may be viewed as a sub-
set of the larger tension between giving effect to broad arbitral au-
thority and recognizing appropriate arbitral limitations. Just as the
restrictive rationale in Garrity is inconsistent with the concept of judi-
cial deference to broad arbitral remedy-making power,159 unprinci-
pled formulations used to find arbitral "excess of powers" threaten to
undermine the accepted policies of arbitral finality. With the increas-
ing acceptance of arbitral punitive damages may come acceptance of
the fashioning of "unique" remedies not explicitly derived from the
express language in the contract.
C. Arbitral vs. Judicial Remedy Power
Analogies to the specific punitive damages struggle suffer from
one important distinction from the present controversy over general
arbitral remedial powers: with punitive damages, arbitrators are ac-
corded remedy power equal to that of courts, 60 whereas in AMD,' 6'
arbitrators have remedy power arguably above and beyond that of a
court. However, it is probably unnecessary and possibly harmful to
suggest that the solution to the dilemma is to limit an arbitrator's re-
medial power to that of a court. The Uniform Arbitration Act explic-
itly authorizes that "the fact that the relief was such that it could not
or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not a ground for
vacating or refusing to confirm the award."'1 62
Courts and commentators generally agree with the Model Act,163
finding that it enhances the bargain for arbitral finality and flexibility.
159. Stipanowich, supra note 9, at 970.
160. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir.
1989) (arguing that where parties intend to resolve "all disputes" through arbitrators hav-
ing the power to grant "any remedy or relief," they accordingly allow the arbitrators to
"award the same varieties and forms of damages or relief as a court would be empowered
to award.").
161. 885 P.2d 994, 1008 (Cal. 1994).
162. UNIF. ARBITRATION Acr § 12(a), 7 U.L.A. 140 (1956) (emphasis added).
163. E.g., AMD, 885 P.2d at 1008, 1011; Public Serv. Co. of Colo. v. International Bhd.
of Elec. Workers, 902 F.2d 19, 20 (10th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he power of arbitrators concerning
every body of law is broader than the power of courts concerning those same bodies of
law."); Teamsters Union Local No. 115 v. DeSoto, Inc., 725 F.2d 931, 937 (3d Cir. 1984)
("The principle of deference enunciated in [Enterprise Wheel] demands that the arbitrator
be given equal, if not greater, latitude to fashion an award[.]"); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.
[PG&E] v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. Rptr. 295, 313 (Ct. App. 1993) ("We need not inquire
whether we would be required to reverse the decision of a lower court which made the
same decision as the arbitrators in this case."); Rochester City Sch. District v. Rochester
Teachers Ass'n, 362 N.E.2d 977, 981 (N.Y. 1977) ("In other words a court may not vacate
an award because the arbitrator has exceeded the power the court would have, or would
have had if the parties had chosen to litigate, rather than arbitrate the dispute. Those who
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A few have disagreed, finding it unfair that a party in arbitration re-
ceive relief unobtainable in the courts.164 It is unquestionable that the
principle of limiting arbitrators' remedial powers to those of a court,
while appearing to be a bright line rule, invites judicial substantive
review of the merits that severely cuts back the bargained-for advan-
tages of efficiency and finality in arbitration. As expected, such a rule
would also be unworkable because express findings are not required
in arbitral awards. 165 The AMD majority noted:
To determine whether a remedy is within the range a court could
award, a reviewing court would inevitably have to interpret the con-
tract and resolve factual and legal disputes on questions such as the
nature of the breach and the extent of the cognizable injury to the
nonbreaching party.166
Such a task by the reviewing court would be repetitive and unduly
substantive, and would impermissibly interfere with the arbitrator's
function of finally determining the merits of the dispute.
D. Considerations for Legislative Clarification
Ideally, legislative amendment of the presently existing statutory
"excess of power" provisions will clarify both the scope of an arbitra-
tor's remedial powers, and the standard of review courts are to use in
considering a motion to vacate an award. 67 Given the courts' struggle
have chosen arbitration as their forum should recognize that arbitration procedures and
awards often differ from what may be expected in courts of law."); Staklinski v. Pyramid
Elec. Co., 160 N.E.2d 78, 80 (N.Y. 1959) ("Whether a court of equity could issue a specific
performance decree in a case like this is beside the point.") (citation omitted); Ruppert v.
Egelhofer, 148 N.E.2d 129, 131 (N.Y. 1958) (allowing arbitration remedy of injunctive re-
lief contrary to New York statute); OEHMKE, supra note 59, § 3:32a, at 225 (Supp. 1993); St.
Antoine, supra note 52, at 1141 ("I see nothing anomalous in according an arbitral award
greater finality, in either a labor or commercial context, than would be accorded a trial
court's construction of the selfsame contract. Such deference to finality is consistent with
the parties' bargain to save time and cost.").
164. See Safeway Stores v. Bakery Workers Local 111, 390 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1968)(arguing that the award should be set aside if "no judge, or group of judges, could ever
conceivably have made such a ruling"); AMD, 885 P.2d at 1012-13 (Kennard, J., dissent-
ing); Mandel, supra note 9, at 510 ("the interjection of commercial arbitration should not
allow the winning party to obtain relief which he could not have in a judicial determination
of the controversy") (emphasis and footnote omitted). At one time California seemed to
agree with this position. See Levy v. Superior Court, 104 P.2d 770, 774 (Cal. 1940).
165. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
166. AMD, 885 P.2d at 1011.
167. It is also important to specify the showing necessary to establish "excess of pow-
ers." E.g., Willoughby Roofing v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353,357 (N.D. Ala. 1984)
("federal policy places a heavy burden upon those claiming that arbitrators' awards exceed
their authority" (citations omitted)), affd, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985); Malekzadeh v.
Wyshock, 611 A.2d 18,21 (Del. Ch. 1992) ("A party moving to vacate an arbitration award
on the grounds that the Arbitrators exceeded their powers ... must show by strong and
convincing evidence that the Arbitrator clearly exceeded his authority.")
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with these issues, it is conceivable that legislative clarification is not
possible, absent some "bright-line" rule such as that suggested by the
AMD dissent.168 Should legislators attempt to amend the enforcing
statute, it is important that certain principles be adhered to in clarify-
ing exactly when a fashioned-remedy exceeds arbitral authority.
First, flexibility in arbitral remedial power is crucial. The ques-
tion of a remedy usually is not considered until after a dispute
arises.169 Accordingly, arbitrators must be afforded liberal authority
to "do justice" in creating remedies appropriate to the (perhaps unan-
ticipated) injury.170 The principle of arbitral flexibility is loyal to the
concept of the arbitrator as the "contract reader."
Second, review of commercial arbitration awards stemming from
a contractual dispute involves consideration of the "fundamental pur-
pose of contract remedies" such as "the protection of societally useful
exchange.' 7' With this principle, an arbitral remedy is upheld if it
arguably protects the contractual "exchange relationship" at issue;172
a seemingly erroneous award reflects a creative, though proper, reso-
lution of the dispute. 173 In this regard, it should also be recognized
that the commercial system of exchange does contemplate some pre-
dictability of the risks in contractual relationships. 174 Although cer-
tain breaches and injuries may not be foreseeable at the time the
underlying contract is entered into, such injuries may be contemplated
at the time of the breach itself.
Courts should not be entirely stripped of their essential purpose
of promoting justice when faced with an "outrageous" remedy. Pri-
vate parties should not be allowed to take advantage of the courts by
obtaining confirmation of an "outrageous" award, when such confir-
mation has the force of a judgment at law. 175 While increasing judicial
and legislative encouragement of the arbitration process is consistent
with policies of arbitral flexibility and finality, unbridled support may
well bring arbitral downfall. Commercial parties will feel compelled
to draft extremely narrow arbitration agreements that are contrary to
168. AMD, 885 P.2d at 1012-13 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
169. See Stipanowich, supra note 9, at 1000.
170. Accord SCM Corp. v. Fisher Park Lane Co., 358 N.E.2d 1024, 1028 (N.Y. 1976).
171. Hackett, supra note 86, at 308.
172. See id. at 304, 308.
173. See Kaden, supra note 4, at 297-98.
174. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
175. Accord Randall, supra note 111, at 783:
Arbitration is no panacea. It cannot replace the courts, which are ultimately re-
sponsible for enforcing the laws of the land and safeguarding the unrepresented
public. The arbitrator, often a non-lawyer, is merely a contract-reader.... While
the judiciary should generally defer to the merits of an arbitration award, federal
courts should not abdicate their essential role of enforcing the laws of the land
and representing the public.
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the broad scope recommended by the American Arbitration Associa-
tion.176 Worse, parties will express their lack of confidence in the pri-
vate arbitration system by not choosing it at all. Indeed, "the ongoing
trend toward arbitral gigantism may well result in the fall of this juris-
prudential Goliath. '177
An adequate record of arbitral decision making process is neces-
sary for meaningful judicial review. Therefore, this Note advocates
the statutory requirement of minimal written findings by the arbitra-
tor. This state might resemble the following:
ADEQUATE RECORD FOR REVIEw OF AWARD
(a) The court shall review an award [in accordance with those
provisions regarding correcting, vacating, and confirming the award]
only if presented with the arbitrator's written findings which must
include:
(1) a summary of the submitted claims or a certified copy of the
claims actually submitted;
(2) the arbitrator's interpretation of the disputed portions of
the parties' underlying agreement;
(3) the arbitrator's determination regarding the claims, includ-
ing how and to what extent the underlying agreement was breached
and by whom;
(4) the arbitrator's determination of the nature and extent of
the injury incurred due to any breach; and
(5) the arbitrator's determination of appropriate relief corre-
sponding to the found breach.
(b) If the court is not presented with the arbitrator's findings in
accordance with subsection (a), the court shall remand the applica-
tion to review the award back to the arbitrator.
The written findings requirement would serve several purposes.
For courts attempting to review an arbitral award, the written deter-
minations will avoid judicial second-guessing of contractual interpre-
tation and breach. Arguably, because of the lack of an express
findings requirement, the AMD majority felt compelled to formulate
a broad holding encompassing implied contract interpretations and
176. See Sullivan, supra note 12, at 1113. Narrowly or explicitly drafted arbitration
agreements are often recommended by practitioners. See OEHMKE, supra note 59, § 4"28,
at 101; RoTH Er AL., supra note 23, § 4:12, at 8-9.
However, such drafting provides questionable protection: one court has held that ar-
bitrators do not exceed the scope of their authority by awarding relief other than that
requested; this court found that Rule 43 operated to give the requested relief only the
effect of "proposals" and "not exclusive alternatives." Malekzadeh v. Wyshock, 611 A.2d
18, 22 (Del. Ch. 1992) (citing ROBERT M. RODMAN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 21.3
(1984)). Another court upheld an award of punitive damages despite the fact that one
party asserted that it "'d[id] not consent to the submission' of punitive damages issues" to
arbitration in a memorandum response to the demand for arbitration. Raytheon Co. v.
Automated Business Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir. 1989) (alteration in original).
177. Sullivan, supra note 12, at 1113.
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implied breach-of-contract determinations. 178 This standard of review
seems equivalent to no review at all, and the one circumstance permit-
ting the vacatur or correction of an award, i.e., when "the reviewing
court is compelled to infer the award was based on an extrinsic
source,"'179 seems beyond reach when courts must resolve all doubts in
favor of upholding the award. 180 Yet incredibly, if the arbitrator in
AMD had not set forth in writing his understanding of the contract
and the breach of implied covenants, it would have been difficult to
rationalize, post hoc, how the award of intellectual property rights was
not based on an extrinsic source. Moreover, those intellectual prop-
erty rights were for a product that was not within the terms of the
contract, and was in fact the subject of pending federal litigation.181
With the statutory findings requirement, the reviewing court need
not imply the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract or findings of
breach. Instead, the court's only task will be to determine if the rem-
edy is rationally related to the express findings. Because the arbitra-
tor in AMD provided reasoned findings, this requirement probably
would not have changed the AMD outcome. However, a written find-
ings requirement might have served to considerably narrow AMD's
broad holding. The proposed provision should not open the door to a
substantive review of the dispute's merits with issues such as contract
interpretation and breach, but is meant only to aid the court in review-
ing an arbitral remedy by requiring a minimum record. The require-
ment should not unduly burden the arbitrator, who is simply asked to
record those decision-making steps presumably already taken.
A written findings requirement would also contribute to the per-
ception of basic fairness in the proceedings. Whether they win or lose,
parties who entrust their disputes to arbitration are more likely to feel
adequately heard and to perceive that their disagreements were fairly
determined when presented with a reasoned award at the end of the
proceedings. The absence of a reasoned award will unduly contribute
to the dissatisfaction of the losing party, and possibly introduce the
nagging suspicion that the winning party somehow received some
windfall. Although some arbitrators might have to spend more time
and effort to comply with the requirement, there is nothing wrong
with requiring an arbitrator to commit the determinations in writing,
especially when legislatures and courts sanction their decisions.
Hopefully, the combination of a reasoned award that satisfies the par-
ties and a policy of broad deference to arbitrator's decisions will serve
to reduce rather than increase petitions for review of awards in court.
178. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
179. AMD, 885 P.2d 994, 1006 (Cal. 1994).
180. Id. at 1009.
181. See id at 1008-10.
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E. A Word to Practitioners
Given the uncertainty in the courts regarding review of arbitral
remedies and the expansive view of arbitral authority set forth in cases
such as AMD, parties who wish to place certain limits on an arbitra-
tor's remedial power should expressly set forth those limitations in the
arbitration agreement or submission.182 Such provisions may, inter
alia: require the arbitrator to articulate specific findings; limit the ar-
bitrator's remedial power to that of a court's; set forth certain exclu-
sive relief, limiting relief to money damages only, or to "no more than
$X," or, no punitive damages; or, specify a heightened standard of
judicial review. Express limitations set upon an arbitrator's remedial
powers should be carefully fashioned. A court that is unable to com-
ply with the provision, because of an incomplete or ambiguous record,
for example, may have to remand the case to the arbitrator for clarifi-
cation, thus further defeating the arbitral bargain of efficiency. Fi-
nally, parties should think carefully before agreeing to arbitration
because the process may not be appropriate for their relationship. For
example, in AMD, the parties each spent more than $100 million in
legal costs, while their arbitration dragged on for over four and one-
half years. By the time it was over, the technology over which the
parties were arguing had become obsolete.183
Conclusion
The arbitral advantages of efficiency, flexibility, and finality fhave
long attracted commercial parties and legal practitioners. Legislative
response to the increasingly overcrowded judicial system has en-
couraged arbitral determinations by limiting statutory grounds of re-
view. By reviewing general concepts from the law of remedies,
drawing upon the discipline of labor arbitration, and examining the
sources of an arbitrator's powers, the parameters of arbitral authority
may be discerned. Courts have been unable to resist invoking various
verbal formulae first to review, then to reject arbitrators' awards that
were perceived to grant remedies outside the scope of their authority.
Many of these articulated standards, such as the "essence of the agree-
ment," are vague and authorize untoward judicial activism in the
realm of the arbitrator.
Arbitrators, as "contract readers," should be afforded the same
substantial flexibility in fashioning relief as they are in determining
182. The AMD majority apparently found crucial the parties' lack of intent to limit the
arbitrator's remedial power. Id. at 1007, 1011.
183. Margaret A. Jacobs, Intel-Advanced Micro Case Stirs Debate Over Arbitrators'
Powers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1995, at B6; see also Donna M. Sadowy, Case Note, Ad-
vanced Micro Devices v. Intek" Do You Really Want to Arbitrate?, 10 SANTA CLARA COM-
PUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 239 (1994).
August 1995] ARBITRATION AWARDS
1938 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
substantive rights. While this lesson may be gleaned somewhat from
the historical struggle over the acceptance of arbitral awards of puni-
tive damages, arbitral remedial power should extend beyond that of a
court. Review of a challenged remedy must draw upon recognized
principles of arbitral authority: while arbitral flexibility to "do justice"
is crucial, the choice of remedy must arguably protect the contractual
exchange at issue. Finally, courts must have some principled grounds
on an adequate record to pass upon the arbitrator's choice of remedy.
If "outrageous" awards are summarily enforced, commercial parties
will not choose the arbitration process, thus frustrating legislative en-
couragement of this method of alternative dispute resolution.
